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Canadian Combines Law: A Perspective on the
Current Combines Investigation Act and Recent
Case Law
by Barry R. Campbell*
I. Historical Background
The anti-trust or anti-combines law of Canada has had a lengthy
legislative evolution beginning in the late 1800s. Over the last ninety
years, the combines offences have been revised, and the framework for
the administration of the various Combines Investigation Acts refined to
take into account constitutional challenges and changing economic con-
ditions.
In 1889, predating any U.S. anti-trust legislation, Canada's first
Combines Investigation Act, An Act for the Prevention and Suppression
of Combinations Formed in Restraint of Trade' was passed by the Do-
minion Parliament. In 1892 the provisions of this act were included in
the Criminal Code, where they co-existed with the provisions in the vari-
ous Combines Investigation Acts until all were consolidated into the
Combines Investigation Act in 1960.
The Act of 1889 failed to establish a mechanism for the investiga-
tion of combines in restraint of trade and therefore, in 1910, an Act to
Provide for the Investigation of Combines, Monopolies, Trusts and
Mergers 2 was enacted. This Act expanded the definition of "combine"
to include mergers, monopolies and trusts, and provided a mechanism
whereby six or more persons could apply to ajudge for an order directing
an investigation of an alleged combine. If satisfied that there were rea-
* Associate, McCarthy and McCarthy, Toronto, Ontario; B.A. 1971, LL.B. 1975, B.C.L.
1976, McGill University; LL.M. 1977, Harvard Law School.
I An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations Formed in Restraint of
Trade, 1889, 52 Vict., c.41 (Can.). Section 1 of the Act made it an offence to conspire, combine,
agree or arrange unlawfully:
(a) To unduly limit the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying,
storing or dealing in any article or commodity which may be a subject of trade or commerce; or
(b) To restrain or injure trade or commerce in relation to any such article or commodity; or
(c) To unduly prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or production of any such article or
commodity, or to unreasonably enhance the price thereof; or
(d) To unduly prevent or lessen competition in the production, manufacture, purchase,
barter, sale, transportation or supply of any such article or commodity, or in the price of insur-
ance upon person or property.
2 The Combines Investigation Act, 1910, 9 & 10 Edw. 7, c.9 (Can.).
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sonable grounds to believe that an injurious combine existed, the judge
could order an investigation in the public interest. Investigations were to
be conducted by adhoc boards created by the Minister of Labour. The
Board could find that a party had committed a combines offence and
impose a fine if the violations continued. The Act also provided for spe-
cial remedies when patents and custom duties were involved. 3 The Act
of 1910 failed to establish a permanent body to investigate and prosecute
combines violations. Consequently, a lengthy struggle began to settle
upon an acceptable administrative procedure for the administration of
the combines provisions.
In 1919 the Act of 1910 was repealed. The Combines and Fair
Prices Act,4 which took its place, provided that the recently established
Board of Commerce5 was to constitute the body which was "directed to
restrain and prohibit the formation and the operations of combines."
6
These two acts were found unconstitutional 7 however, and a new Com-
bines Investigation Act was passed in 1923.8 The new Act provided that
a permanent Registrar was to administer the Combines Investigation
Act.9 On the application of six persons, at the request of the Minister, or
on his own initiative, the Registrar could conduct a preliminary inquiry.
If necessary, a more formal inquiry would follow.' 0 In 1935 the Com-
bines Investigation Act Amendment Act II placed the administration of
the combines provisions in the hands of a Commission.' 2 This provision
was repealed 13 in 1937, and administration was placed in a single Com-
missioner who was given extensive powers of investigation and was re-
quired to report to the Minister.14
At the end of this fifty year evolutionary period, Canada had in
place a structure for the investigation of anti-competitive behavior, the
possibility of prosecution of combines offences, and available remedies
ranging from fines to the restriction of patent privileges and the elimina-
tion of tariffs. However, a government committee report 15 led to further
refinements. Further amendments' 6 to the Combines Investigation Act
provided for a division of the functions previously carried on by the
3 See text accompanying notes 55-69 infra. These remedies exist in the current Combines
Investigation Act.
4 The Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c.45 (Can.).
5 The Board of Commerce Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c.37 (Can.).
6 The Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c.45, § 4 (Can.).
7 In re Bd. of Commerce Act, 1919; Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919, [19221 1 A.C.
191.
8 The Combines Investigation Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c.9 (Can.).
9 Id §§ 5-6.
10 Id § 7.
"1 The Combines Investigation Act Amendment Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c.54 (Can.).
12 Id § 10.
13 The Combines Investigation Act Amendment Act, 1937, 1 Geo. 6, c.23, § 4 (Can.).
14 Id §§ 5-9.
15 See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMBINES LEGISLATION AND INTERIM
REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1952).
16 Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.314 (1952).
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Commissioner under the Act. 17 Two separate agencies were created-a
Director of Investigation and Research, to conduct investigations and re-
search, and the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, with the respon-
sibility for appraisal of evidence and report to the Minister. Although
the 1952 Amendments left the offence provisions mostly unchanged, they
did provide for changes to the remedial provisions of the Act by first,
eliminating limits on fines and leaving fines to the discretion of the court,
second, providing for judicial prohibition orders18 and third, empower-
ing the court to dissolve mergers and monopolies. 19 Section 4220 was also
added, providing the Director of Investigation and Research with a gen-
eral power of inquiry into monopolistic situations and restraint of
trade. 2 '
In 1960 the Criminal Code provisions relating to combines were
taken out of the Code and consolidated with the provisions in the Com-
bines Investigation Act.2 2 The Amendments of 1960 added new provi-
sions exempting from the Act agreements relating to certain matters such
as the exchange of statistics, if not used to breach fundamental provi-
sions. Further excluded from the application of the Act were combina-
tions relating to the export of products. Certain other substantive
changes adding sections relating to resale price maintenance, promo-
tional allowances and misleading price advertising were made and re-
main in the Act today. 23
The last full scale review of Canada's competition law began with a
special reference by the Canadian Government to the Economic Council
of Canada in July 1966. The Economic Council was asked to study and
advise regarding combines, mergers, monopolies and restraint of trade in
the light of the government's long-term economic objectives. 24 Extensive
review of the competition law of Canada had not been undertaken for
some time, and in the interim fundamental changes to the internal Cana-
dian economy and the external economic environment had taken place.
The transfer of the administration of the Act from the Department of
Justice to the new Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs fur-
ther necessitated a review. In July 1969 the Economic Council com-
pleted its report 25 which called for substantial revisions in the Combines
Investigation Act. In 1971 the government introduced a draft Competi-
17 Id. §§ 5-15.
18 Id § 31.
19 d
20 Section 42 now appears as section 47"in the 1976 amendments.
21 See text accompanying notes 66-75 infra.
22 An Act to amend the Combines Investigation Act and the Criminal Code, CAN. REv.
STAT. c.23 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Combines Investigation Act].
23 See notes 148-156 and accompanying text infra.
24 See Privy Council Office, Press Release, July 22, 1966, reprithed in ECONOMIC COUNCIL
OF CANADA, INTERIM REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 199-201 app. (1969).
25 ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, INTERIM REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1969).
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tion Act to replace the Combines Investigation Act. 2 6 After hostile reac-
tion the government decided to split the reform process into two stages.
Stage I amendments were introduced in 1973, then reintroduced as Bill
C-2 in 1975 and finally came into force on January 1, 1976.27 At the
same time numerous studies were ordered by the government.2 8 In 1977
the Stage II proposals were introduced as Bill C-42.29 The Stage II pro-
posals suggested significant changes in the areas of monopolies, mergers
and reviewable matters and further anticipated that procedural changes
would include a new class action right. The extensive changes contem-
plated by the Stage II proposals, and the shuffling of Cabinet portfolios
which occurred at the same time, led to the withdrawal of Bill C-42 and
the reintroduction of the Stage II amendments as Bill C- 13 in November
1977.30 Bill C-13 remained in limbo through the last years of the Liberal
Government, at times encouraged as necessary and overdue, but most
often criticized as an excessively broad and complex hindrance to the
development of the Canadian economy. With the recent change of gov-
ernment, the status of the Stage II amendments remains in doubt.
3 1
This paper will examine the Combines Investigation Act, as
amended by the Stage I revisions of 1976 and will canvass the proposed
Stage II amendments for an indication of the possible direction of future
amendments.
II. Policy and Criminal Law Basis of the Combines Investigation Act
The Combines Investigation Act is the "major embodiment of the
competition policy of Canada, ' '3 2 reflecting "the basic attitude towards
competition in the economy."133 It should be noted that the Combines
Investigation Act of Canada has been upheld by the Canadian courts as
26 C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess., 19-20 Eliz. II, (1970-71) (Can.) (intro. June 29, 1971).
27 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, as amended by Act of Dec. 15, 1975, Can. Stat.
c.76 (1976).
28 See, .g., L. SKEOCH & B. MCDONALD, DYNAMIC CHANGE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN A
CANADIAN MARKET ECONOMY (1976); STUDIES OF FOREIGN COMPETITION POLICY AND
PRACTICE (1976); R. COHEN & J. ZIEGEL, THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR A
NEW TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1976); M. TREBILCOCK, A. DUGGAN, L. ROBINSON, H. WILTON-
SIEGEL & C. MASSE, PROPOSED POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THE REGULATION
OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN CANADA (1976).
29 C-42, 30th Pan., 2d Sess. (1976-77) (Can.).
30 C-13, 30th Parl., 3d Sess. (1977) (Can.).
31 For discussion of Stage II proposals see text accompanying notes 168-69 nfira.
32 Henry, Anti-Combines Legislation in Canada, [1971] W.C.J. MEREDITH LECTURES 8, 13
(1971).
33 Id
The purpose of the Combines Investigation Act is to assist in maintaining effec-
tive competition as a prime stimulus to the achievement of maximum production,
distribution and employment in a mixed system of public and private enterprise.
To this end, the legislation seeks to eliminate certain practices in restraint of trade
and to overcome the bad effects of concentration, that tend to prevent the eco-
nomic resources of Canada from being used more effectively to the advantage of
all. The Act also contains provisions against misleading advertising and decep-
tive marketing practices in order to utilize the investigative capacity of the Act for
the protection of the consumer.
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a valid exercise of the "criminal law power" which is vested in the Fed-
eral Parliament by the British North America Act.34 The criminal law
basis for the Combines Investigation Act has had an inhibiting effect
upon the enforceability of the Act. Proof of combines offences has had to
meet the strict criminal law standard of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." The absence, until recently, of any statutory action akin to the
civil treble damages action available in the United States, has left prose-
cutions for combines offences solely to the discretion of the Department
of Justice in consultation with Competition Bureau officials. 'This limita-
tion has severely limited prosecutions under the Act. The Government
has been forced to undertake cases selectively, to opt for those prosecu-
tions perceived as the most likely to succeed. The clear-cut cases involv-
ing little investigation, cases concerning restraints with an important
impact on the economy, cases involving new points of law or interpreta-
DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, DEP'T OF CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AF-
FAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 7, COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT (1978).
The Economic Council of Canada expressed the philosophical thrust of Canada's competi-
tion policy as follows:
The institution and maintenance of a competition policy such as presently exists
in Canada may be taken to reflect a belief that, over the greater part of the econ-
omy, competitive market forces are potentially capable of allocating resources
better and more cheaply, with a less cumbersome administrative overhead, than
any alternative arrangement such as wholesale public ownership and control, de-
tailed government regulation of enterprise, or self-regulation by large industrial
units within a corporate state. The function of competition policy is not to bring
about a textbook regime of "perfect" competition in all the various markets mak-
ing up the system, but rather to encourage the liberation of the system's maxi-
mum competitive potential, "imperfect" though this may be. The resulting
competition is valued not for itself, but for what it can accomplish in putting
resources to work efficiently and effectively. Thus the market does the job, and
the government's main responsibility so far as efficiency in resource allocation is
concerned, is to see that the market is free to do the best job of which it is capable.
Competition is relied upon as the prime mechanism of social control.
ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, supra note 25, at 8. And, as the former Director of Investiga-
tion and Research, D.H.W. Henry, expressed it:
The legislation postulates the continuing existence of a free enterprise economy,
actuated by the profit motive, in which those who wish to compete for economic
gain should, to the largest extent possible, be allowed to compete free from artifi-
cial restraints imposed upon them by their competitors or other members of trade
or industry. What Parliament contemplates, as expressed in this legislation, is the
regulation of industry by the forces of competition rather than regulation by
members of the industry itself.
Address by D.H.W. Henry to New York State Bar Association, Antitrust Law Section (Jan. 30,
1964).
34 In the case of Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. A.G. Canada, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 1, Lord
Atkin stated:
The substance of the Act is by section two to define, and by section thirty-two to
make criminal, combines which the Legislature in the public interest intends to
prohibit. The definition is wide, and may cover activities which have not hitherto
been considered to be criminal. But only those combinations are affected 'which
have operated or are likely to operate to the detriment or against the interest of
the public, whether consumers, producers or others;' and if Parliament genuinely
determines that commercial activities which can be so described are to be sup-
pressed in the public interest, their Lordships see no reason why Parliament
should not make them crimes.
1d at 9.
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tion, and cases involving highly concentrated industries have of necessity
been favoured to best utilize scarce government resources. 34a
A limited civil cause of action is now contained in the Act, 35 but
expansion of the civil law remedy as well as expansion of the federal
power to regulate competition will have to await future amendments. A
determination that the federal "trade and commerce power" may be
used to justify regulation of competition, would also augment the federal
jurisdiction in this area. Attempts to further expand the federal power to
regulate competition in the marketplace will be met with the constitu-
tional argument that broad federal regulation is an interference with the
provincial constitutional jurisdiction over "property and civil rights."
While the courts have recognized that the Federal Parliament may use
the criminal law power to define new crimes subject to federal regula-
tion, this cannot be used as a method of usurping all provincial power.
Overly creative federal regulation of the marketplace is not likely to be
accepted by the courts as a valid exercise of the criminal law power. The
federal "trade and commerce power" has never been fully developed by
the courts, but until it can be established definitively that the federal
"trade and commerce power" is a valid basis for the regulation of compe-
tition, the Combines Investigation Act will not escape its criminal law
straight jacket.36
Ill. Structure of the Act-An Overview
A. Application of the Act to Products and Services
Prior to the most recent amendments to the Combines Investigation
Act, the Act did not apply to the bulk of the service industry. The 1976
Amendments replaced the word "article," wherever used in the Act, with
the word "product" and defined "product" to include both "articles"
and "services." As a result, services now covered by the Act include the
professions, financial services, 37 other business services 38 and consumer
services.3 9 In short, the full spectrum of economic activity is now subject
to the provisions of the Combines Investigation Act.
B. Exemptions from the Act
The Combines Investigation Act provides that certain activities are
exempt from the general application of the statute. Section 4 of the Act
exempts collective agreements, the arrangements among fishermen or
34a Henry, supra note 32, at 31-32.
35 See text accompanying note 56 'nfra.
36 For a full discussion of this constitutional problem, see R. GoSSE, THE LAW OF COMPE-
TITION IN CANADA 226-66 (1962). See also Hogg & Grover, The Constiulionahy of the Competzion
Bill, I CAN. Bus. L. REV. 197 (1977); S. GRANGE, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL
INTERVENTION IN THE MARKETPLACE-THE COMPETITION CASE (1975).
37 Eg., underwriting and credit reporting.
38 E.g., real estate sales, advertising, construction and maintenance.
39 E.g., laundry, cleaning and repair.
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their associations, and the activities of employers associations, so far as
these activities relate to the negotiating of collective agreements. Section
4 also exempts agreements relating to amateur sport and provides a lim-
ited exemption with respect to g the underwriting of securities. With
respect to the specific application of section 32, the general conspiracy in
restraint of trade provision, the Act provides limited exemptions for the
activities of trade associations and for agreements relating to export
trade.40
The case law has also created an important area of exemption.
Where activities are directly regulated by federal or provincial statute,
market competition has been deemed superseded by state control, and
the Combines Investigation Act has therefore been excluded. In Regina v.
Canadian Brewer's,4 1 it was held that where a provincial legislature has
conferred on a commission or board the power to regulate an industry,
including the power to fix prices (e.g., in a provincial agricultural prod-
ucts marketing scheme) and that power has been exercised, the court
must presume that the power has been exercised in the public interest.42
In the face of such a situation, successful prosecution of an alleged com-
bine in the regulated market would necessitate proof that the alleged
combine was operating to hinder the regulatory body from exercising its
power to protect the public interest. Generally, therefore, markets regu-
lated by valid provincial and federal legislation are excluded from attack
under the Combines Investigation Act. Of course, activities left unregu-
lated in an otherwise regulated market might still be subject to attack.
For instance, if a provincial scheme regulated prices, but not packaging
or quality, a combination which had the effect of unduly limiting compe-
tition in these areas might be prosecuted.
C Anti-Competitive Practices
The Combines Investigation Act encompasses two types of anti-
competitive practices: the "combines offences," consisting of widely rec-
ognized pernicious anti-competitive behavior and the "reviewable prac-
tices," less serious behavior which may or may not be justified.
1. Combit'es Ofnces
Part V of the Act sets out the combines offences-offences which
are punishable with penal consequences. 4 3 It is an indictable offence
40 See text accompanying note 124 infa.
41 [1960] O.R. 601.
42 Id; see also Reference re Farm Products Marketing Act, 7 D.L.R.2d 257 (1957).
43 These are (a) combinations to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing,
manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any product (§ 32(1)(a)); combinations to pre-
vent, limit or lessen unduly the manufacture or production of a product or to enhance unrea-
sonably the price (§ 32(1)(b)); combinations to prevent or lessen unduly competition in the
production, manufacture, purchase, sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply of a product
or in the price of insurance (§ 32(1)(c)) or to otherwise restrain or injure competition
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to breach any of the substantive provisions of Part V except that pros-
ecutions for breach of the provisions relating to misleading advertis-
ing,44  testimonials,4 5  pyramid selling,46  referral selling,4 7  and
promotional contests, 48 may be conducted using the less formal sum-
mary conviction procedure or by indictment. Breach of certain pro-
visions49  may be proceeded with only by way of summary
proceedings. Several of the more serious combines offences will be
discussed in detail.
2. Reviewable Matters
Part IV. I of the Act creates a category of "matters reviewable by
the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission." Subject to review are
practices which constitute refusals to deal,50 consignment selling,5' ex-
clusive dealing, 52 market restriction, 53 and tied selling. 54 The review-
able practices are not offences, but where the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission finds that one of the category of reviewable
practices has been present in the market, with an effect which is detri-
mental to competition, the Commission may act to remedy the situa-
tion. The range of remedies available to the Commission will depend
upon the specific practice in question.
D. Special Remedies
In addition to the remedies set out above, the Act contains special
remedies in sections 28 through 31.
Section 30(1) provides that, regardless of any other penalty imposed
upon conviction for breach of one of the combines offences, the court
may issue a "prohibition order" which amounts to a perpetual injunction
prohibiting the repetition of an offence. With respect to merger or mo-
nopoly, dissolution may be ordered. Section 30(2) provides a method
(§ 32(l)(d)); (b) bid rigging (§ 32.2); (c) conspiracies in relation to professional sport (§ 32.3); (d)
mergers and monopolies that operate to the public detriment (§ 33); and (e) unfair trade prac-
tices, including price discrimination (§ 34(l)(a)), predatory pricing (§ 34(l)(b)-34(1)(c)), mis-
leading advertising (§ 36), resale price maintenance (§ 38), referral selling (§ 36.4), promotional
contests (§ 37.2), testimonials (§ 36.1), double ticketing (§ 36.2), pyramid sales (§ 36.3), bait and
switch tactics (§ 37(2)) and sales above advertised price (§ 37.1).
44 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, § 36.
45 Id § 36. 1.
4 Id § 36.3.
47 Id § 36.4.
48 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, § 31.2.
49 These are the provisions relating to double ticketing (§ 36.2), bait and switch selling
(§ 37), and sales above advertised price (§ 37.1).
50 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, § 31.2.
51 Id § 31.3.
52 Id § 31.4.
53 Id
54 d
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whereby similar orders may be issued without any prosecution having
been commenced, when it appears that a person has done, is about to do,
or is likely to do anything constituting or directed towards the commis-
sion of an offence under Part V. Section 29.1 provides for interim in-
junctions when a person has done, is about to do, or is likely to do any
act constituting or directed towards the commission of a Part V offence
and the act, if not restrained, will result in irreparable injury to competi-
tion.
Section 29 of the Act also provides that where use has been made of
patent or trademark rights to commit any of a broad range of combines
offences, the Federal Court of Canada may declare void any licences or
agreements relating to the patent or trademark. The Court may further
direct the grant of licences, restrain the exercise of rights under agree-
ments, expunge or amend a mark or make any other order deemed neces-
sary to prevent use of the patent in an anti-competitive manner.
55
Section 28 of the Act provides that where, as the result of an inquiry
or of a judgment, it appears that there has existed a conspiracy or ar-
rangement, merger or monopoly to promote unduly the advantage of
manufacturers or dealers at the expense of the public, and that such dis-
advantage has been facilitated by the duties on an article, the Governor
in Council may direct that duties on an article be eliminated or reduced
to give the public the benefit of reasonable competition.
Section 31.1, added to the Act in 1976, provides the limited civil
damage action referred to earlier.56 Any action under this section must
be taken within two years of the conduct contrary to Part V, within two
years from an order of the Commission, or within two years of the dispo-
sition of any related criminal proceedings. 57 In order for section 31.1 to
55 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, § 29(e)-29(i).
56 Section 31.1 provides:
(1) Any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of
(a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part V, or
(b) the failure of any person to comply with an order of the Commission or a
court under this Act,
may, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue for and recover from the person
who engaged in the conduct or failed to comply with the order an amount equal
to the loss or damage proved to have been suffered by him, together with any
additional amount that the court may allow not exceeding the full cost to him of
any investigation in connection with the matter and of proceedings under this
section.
(2) In any action under subsection (1) against a person, the record of proceed-
ings in any court in which that person was convicted of an offence under Part V
or convicted of or punished for failure to comply with an order of the Commission
or a court under this Act is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof
that the person against whom the action is brought engaged in conduct that was
contrary to a provision of Part V or failed to comply with an order to the Com-
mission or a court under this Act, as the case may be, and any evidence given in
those proceedings as to the effect of such acts or omissions on the person bringing
the action is evidence thereof in the action.
57 Id subsection (4)(a)-4(b).
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be applicable, three elements must be satisfied. 58 First, damage capable
of compensation must be proved. As a result, injunctive or declaratory
relief is not available. Second, a causal link must be established between
the loss suffered and the anti-competitive conduct. This causal link may
be difficult to establish in the less clear-cut cases in which there has been
injury, but it has not been direct. U.S. courts have looked to "the in-
tended scope of the anti-trust laws as a more reliable guide to standing
than the 'directness' of the relationship between the plaintiff and defend-
ant." 59 The "target area" test, which has evolved in the United States,
requires only that injuries suffered from a deprivation of the benefits of
competition must be "arguably within the ambit of injuries that the anti-
trust laws were intended to prevent."'60 It is unclear if a similar easing of
the directness rule will evolve in Canada. Third, proof must be put for-
ward of a combines breach. The plaintiff will be obliged to establish
either that a combines offence has been committed or that the defendant
has breached an order of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. A
conviction for a combines offence is not required prior to a successful
civil suit.61 A successful plaintiff in a civil suit under section 31.1 would
likely have to prove his case only on a balance of probabilities, the nor-
mal civil standard of proof. Thus, a defendant may be convicted in a
civil action for participation in a conspiracy although acquitted in a re-
lated criminal proceeding.
Section 31.1 provides that the plaintiff in a civil suit may recover his
loss, as well as the cost of investigation in connection with the matter and
the cost of proceedings. Unlike in the United States, in many Canadian
jurisdictions, lawyers are not permitted to operate on a contingency fee
basis. This no doubt would have an inhibiting effect on private anti-
trust enforcement even if as broad a civil remedy as is available in the
United States were to be made available in Canada. Moreover, Canada
is not a very litigious society. It should not be expected that the civil
remedy in the Act will lead to a flood of actions. The provision in section
31.1 allowing recovery of the cost of prosecutions in civil actions goes
only part way in encouraging private enforcement of the Act.
There is substantial doubt as to the constitutional validity of the
provision dealing with civil suits. As discussed earlier,62 there is much
debate about the appropriateness of the federal "trade and commerce
power" as a basis for the regulation of competition. The courts thus far
have justified the federal regulation of competition as a valid exercise of
58 Rowley, Cwi/ Suts and Class Actions Under the Combines Investigation Act, NEW COMBINES
LEGISLATION 21 (1977).
59 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 76 (2d ed. 1974).
60 d
61 Rowley, supra note 58.
62 See text at note 35 supra.
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the federal "criminal law power."'6 3 But it is unlikely that the civil ac-
tion, for which a criminal conviction is not a condition precedent, could
be justified as a valid exercise of the criminal law power. 64
Lastly, section 27.1 of the Act provides that the Director may, at the
request of a regulatory agency, or on his own initiative or upon direction
from the Minister, make representations and call evidence before boards,
commissions or other tribunals. This provision was added by the most
recent amendments to the Act. In his latest Annual Report, 65 the Direc-
tor of Investigation Research set out the policy reasons for such interven-
tions.66 The Annual Report indicates that the Director is authorized to
make representations before Federal Boards and will also make represen-
tations before Provincial Boards, at the request of such boards or on his
own initiative, if permitted to do so. It is the expressed view of the Direc-
tor that excessive regulation of the market leads to a less dynamic econ-
omy. 67 Thus it is not the intention of the Director to be a regulator, but
rather to act as "public interest intervenor," providing advice to regula-
tors to enable them to regulate in a manner that is least restrictive of
market forces. The Annual Report sets out the considerations and prin-
ciples which the Director is guided by in raising his interventions. 6 The
Director has intervened in recent years in several significant regulatory
proceedings in the communications field, a highly regulated field in Can-
ada.69
E Enforcement of the Act
1. Inquir'es by the Director
The Combines Investigation Act is administered by the Director
of Investigation and Research, the Restrictive Trade Practices Com-
mission and the courts.
63 See, e.g., Proprietary Articles Trade Assn. v. A.G. Can., [1931] 2 D.L.R. I (P.C. 1931);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Can. v. Regina, 2 D.L.R.2d 11 (S.C. 1956).
64 For a discussion of the constitutional problem with respect to the civil action, see Row-
ley, supra note 58, at 27.
65 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33.
66 Id at 23.
67 In these circumstances, it is vitally important to limit the reach of direct govern-
ment regulation to situations where it is deemed to be necessary for whatever
reason, be it technological or social. In addition, the powers of regulatory boards
to replace market mechanisms ought to be limited as far as possible, to those
necessary to achieve the defined goal of the regulatory laws. Finally, the regula-
tory authorities should attempt to regulate in a manner that is least restrictive of
competition, consistent with the necessity to attain the primary objectives of the
regulatory laws. It is this last consideration that is of direct relevance to the Di-
rector's policy respecting interventions before regulatory boards.
Id
68 Id at 24.
69 Eg., CNCP Telecommunications Application for Access to Bell Canada System for
Telecommunications Traffic; Challenge Communications, Ltd. v. Bell Canada; Telesat Ca-
nada, Proposed Agreement with Trans-Canada Telephone System; Bell Rate Application, 1978,
reported zn ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 36-38.
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Inquiries under the Act are usually commenced by the Director
when he has reason to believe that there has been a violation of the
Act or that grounds exist for the making of an order with respect to
one of the reviewable matters.70 The Director must commence an
inquiry after application in the prescribed form has been made to
him by six adult persons resident in Canada.71 Further, section 8 of
the Act provides that the Minister may direct that an inquiry be com-
menced.
Another form of inquiry may take place under the provisions of
section 47, the section dealing with general research inquiries. Sec-
tion 47 provides that the Director, upon his own initiative, upon di-
rection of the Minister or at the instance of the Commission, shall
carry out an inquiry concerning the existence and effect of conditions
and practices relating to any product that may be the subject of trade
or commerce and which may be effecting monopolistic situations or a
restraint of trade.72 Section 47(1)(b) provides for a general inquiry
into any matter related to the policy and objectives of the Act.
The purpose of inquiries into possible violations of the Act or
into matters reviewable is to place the facts complained of in perspec-
tive. In the course of his inquiry the Director often will gather evi-
dence concerning not just the practices alleged, but also concerning
the nature of a particular industry. It should be recognized that, even
though an inquiry may be commenced upon application of six per-
sons, whenever the Director conducts an inquiry, the Director is act-
ing pursuant to a statutory duty. Therefore, the inquiry must be
objective and thorough.
The Director has broad evidence gathering powers during the
inquiry stage. The Director or his authorized representative may
enter premises, remove documents and copy them or retain docu-
ments and return copies. 73 The Director may, by notice in writing,
require evidence upon affidavit. 74 In both of these instances, the ac-
tions of the Director must be authorized by the Commission. Section
17(1) provides that, upon the Director's ex parte application to the
Commission or upon the Commission's own initiative, witnesses may
be summoned to give evidence in the course of an inquiry.
Once evidence has been obtained and assessed, the Director has
several choices: First, at any stage of an inquiry, if the Director is of
70 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, § 8, as amended by Act of Dec. i5, i975, Can.
Stat. c.76, § 4 (1976).
71 Id § 7(l), as amended by Act of Dec. 15, 1975, Can. Stat. c.76, § 3 (1976).
72 Id. § 47(1)(a), as amended by Act of Dec. 15, 1975, Can. Stat. c.76, § 25 (1976).
73 Id. §§ 10, Ii.
74 Id § 12.
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the opinion that no further inquiry is justified, the inquiry may be
discontinued. The concurrence of the Commission is required in
those cases in which evidence has been brought before the Commis-
sion and, in all cases, notice of discontinuance must be given to the
Minister who may instruct the Director to make further inquiry. 75
Second, by virtue of section 18, at any stage of an inquiry, the
Director may, if he is of the opinion that evidence discloses an offense
under Part V, and the Director shall, if directed by the Minister, pre-
pare a "Statement of Evidence" to be submitted to the Commission.
The Statement of Evidence consists of a summary of evidence and
allegations. Once the Statement of Evidence has been received by the
Commission, a date is fixed for arguments in favour and against the
Statement of Evidence. 76 At the conclusion of the hearing on the
Statement of Evidence, a report is made to the Minister suggesting
possible remedies.
Third, at any stage of an inquiry and in addition to or in lieu of
continuing the inquiry, the Director may remit all evidence to the
Attorney General of Canada for consideration as to whether a com-
bines offence has been committed and for such action as may be con-
sidered necessary. 77 The Attorney General may institute an action,
seek a prohibition order, or both, or he may choose to do nothing.
In recent years, the practice of the Director of Investigation and
Research has been to refer matters directly to the Attorney General to
avoid the substantial delays inherent in proceeding by way of state-
ment of evidence and report to the Minister.78 There have been
fewer successful prosecutions for violations of the Act than one would
expect, and the consequences flowing from breach of the Act are ulti-
mately less significant than is the case in the United States. 79
2. The Restn'cti've Trade Practices Commission
The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, which has been re-
ferred to only briefly, regulates the conduct by the Director of inquir-
ies into combines offences and also monitors the less serious
"reviewable practices."80
75 id § 14.
76 Id § 18, as amendd by Act of Dec. 15, 1975, Can. Stat. c.76, § 6 (1976).
77 Id § 15.
78 In the past, several criteria were used by the Director of Investigation and Research in
deciding whether to prepare a "statement of evidence" for the Commission with respect to a
combines offence, or whether to turn over the evidence obtained to the Attorney General for
possible prosecution. See Henry, supra note 32, at 31-32.
79 A civil cause of action has only recently been added to the Act and there is no treble
damages provision. See text accompanying notes 56-64 supra.
80 See text at note 158 inhfa.
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The Commission is charged with supervision of the Director and
his agents in their evidence-gathering activities8 ' relating to possible
offences or reviewable practices. The Commission is charged with the
conduct of hearings on "Statements of Evidence" which have been
submitted to the Commission pursuant to section 18, though this pro-
cedure is seldom used. If a hearing on a "Statement of Evidence" is
conducted, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission is re-
quired by section 19 to report to the Minister.82 The report to the
Minister is made public,8 3 unless the Commission indicates that the
public interest would be better served by prohibiting publication.
The report has no binding effect but is informative and suggestive,
and may bring pressure to bear upon certain parties or upon the Di-
rector to institute further steps. In the normal situation, the report is
published and also referred to the Attorney General so that appropri-
ate proceedings may be considered.
8 4
The Commission has broad powers enabling it to remedy situa-
tions relating to refusals to deal, consignment selling, exclusive deal-
ing and market restriction, including tied selling. 5 Remedies
available to the Commission in these situations may consist of cease
and desist orders, orders to a supplier to make a product available,
recommendations to the Minister with respect to customs duties and
orders with respect to any other matter which the Commission con-
siders necessary to overcome the effects of the practice.
8 6
3. Procedural Matters
With respect to the rights of persons involved in a combines in-
quiry, it should be noted that a person who is being examined under
oath, in the course of an inquiry, has the right to be represented by
counsel. Others, whose conduct is being inquired into may, at the
discretion of the Commission, be represnted by counsel when evi-
dence is taken from witnesses.8 However, no person is excused from
attending and giving evidence on the grounds of self-incrimination.
No oral evidence given may be used in any criminal proceedings
81 See text at notes 73 and 74 supra.
82 Section 19(2) of the Combines Investigation Act provides:
The report under subsection (1) shall review the evidence and material, appraise
the effect on the public interest of arrangements and practices disclosed in the
evidence and contain recommendations as to the application of remedies pro-
vided in this Act or other remedies.
83 Id § 19(5).
84 Id. § 15.
85 These are the "reviewable practices."
86 See text accompanying notes 158-168 ifa.
87 Id § 20(i).
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thereafter instituted against the witness.8 8 The Director's inquiry and
his examination of witnesses are a fact gathering process, and no one
is required to make a defence, though counsel present when evidence
is taken may be given the opportunity to cross-examine, or at least to
ask further questions.
The Attorney General may institute court proceedings with re-
spect to a combines offence, when evidence of the offence has been
referred directly to him by the Director or when, after a Statement of
Evidence has been argued upon and a report provided to the Minis-
ter, evidence of an offence is provided to the Attorney General.8 9
Carriage of proceedings is with the Attorney General, and depending
upon the events in question, proceedings may be by way of indict-
ment or by the less formal summary conviction procedure. In some
instances, the Attorney General has a choice of proceeding by indict-
ment, with its more formal procedure and more serious penalties, or
by summary conviction procedure. Trial of an individual may be
before judge alone or judge and jury; however, trials of corporate of-
fenders may only be conducted before a judge alone.90 Section 46 of
the Act provides that non-jury actions may be instituted in the Fed-
eral Court of Canada with the permission of the accused. The Act
contains several special provisions with respect to the admissibility of
evidence in combines trials. One remarkable section, with respect to
written documents proved to have been in the possession of a partici-
pant, 9 1 provides that the written document is prima facie proof that
the participant had knowledge of the document and its contents, that
anything recorded in the document as having been done, said or
agreed upon by any participant was done, said or agreed upon, and
that the document where it appears to have been written by a partici-
pant was written by the participant.
92
IV. Interpretation of the Act-An Examination of the Interpretation
by the Courts of the Leading Provisions of the Act
A. Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade
Section 32, 93 dealing generally with combinations and conspiracies
in restraint of trade, is the basic anti-trust section of the Combines Inves-
88 Id § 20(2), as amendedby Act of Dec. 15, 1975, c.76, § 8 (1976).
89 CAN. REV. STAT. c.23, §§ 15(i), 19(4) (1970).
90 Id. § 44(3).
91 Defined to mean an accused, a co-conspirator or any person otherwise party or privy to
the offense, id. § 45(1).
92 Id. § 45(2)(c)(i)-45(2)(c)(iii).
93 CAN. REV. STAT. c.23, § 32 (1970), as amended y Act of Dec. 15, 1975, Can. Stat. c.76
§ 14(l) (1975). Section 32 provides:
(1) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person
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tigation Act. If one disregards cases of misleading advertising, it is pursu-
ant to section 32 that most combines cases evolve. Section 32(1) now
relates to dealings in a "product," defined to include an "article" and a
"service." Service means a service of any description, 94 including indus-
trial, trade, and professional services, and "article" is given an extensive
definition to include real and personal property of every kind and
description.
Section 32(1) provides that everyone who conspires, combines,
agrees or arranges with another person to do any of the enumerated acts
is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment. 95 Lawyers are well
aware that agreements may be express or implied, but the Act also
speaks of one who "arranges" with another to do an enumerated act.
The word "arrangement" has evaded precise definition. However, in the
case of British Basic Slag Ltd v. Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, 96
quoted in Regina v. Armco Canada Ltd ,97 a definition was framed as fol-
lows:
No necessary or useful purpose would be served by attempting an ex-
panded and comprehensive definition of the word "arrangement" in
subs. 6(3) of the Act. "As I see it, all that is required," said Cross J., L.R.
3 R.P. 178, 196 "to constitute an arrangement not enforceable in law is
that the parties to it shall have communicated with one another in some
way, and that as a result of the communication each has intentionally
aroused in the other an expectation that he will act in a certain way." I
think that I am only expressing the same concept in slightly different
terms if I say without attempting an exhaustive definition, for there are
many ways in which arrangements may be made, that it is sufficient to
constitute an arrangement between A and B, if (1) A makes a represen-
tation as to his future conduct with the expectation and intention that
such conduct on his part will operate as an inducement to B to act in a
particular way, (2) such representation is communicated to B, who has
knowledge that A so expected and intended, and (3) such representation
or A's conduct in fulfillment of it operates as an inducement, whether
among other inducements or not, to B to act in that particular way.
98
Canadian judges, like their American counterparts, have had to
(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufactur-
ing, supplying, storing or dealing in any product,
(b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production of a
product, or to enhance unreasonably the price thereof,
(c) to prevent, or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manufac-
ture, purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply of
a product, or in the price of insurance upon persons or property, or
(d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years or a
fine of one million dollars or to both.
94 CAN. REV. STAT. c.23, § 32 (1970), as amended by Act of Dec. 15, 1975, Can. Stat. c.76,
§ 1 (1975).
95 "The essence of the offence is the agreement, and the offence is complete when the
agreement is entered into notwithstanding that the parties may not in fact have carried it out."
Henry, supra note 32, at 37. See also Weidman v. Schragge, 2 D.L.R. 734, 761 (1912).
96 [1963] 2 All E.R. 807.
97 70 D.L.R.3d 287 (1974).
98 119631 2 All E.R. at 819.
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struggle with the problem of "conscious parallelism," that situation
which may occur in an oligopolistic market when each firm consciously
follows a parallel course of conduct. The problem has been in determin-
ing when such behaviour, which may be the natural outcome of an
oligopolistic market, has not arisen of itself, but has been encouraged.
Parallel behaviour will have pernicious anti-competitive effects, whether
of natural development or otherwise, but the Act would seem to embrace
only those situations in which some element of collusion may be evi-
denced.99 Oligopolists are aware that their actions will be mimicked in
the market, but oligopolistic behaviour itself is not prohibited.
This issue has most recently arisen in the case of Regina v. Canadian
GeneralElectric Co. 100 (the large lamps case). The defendants in that case
were three independent Canadian corporations. The Crown alleged:
that the accused conspired to lessen unduly competition by an agree-
ment or arrangement to adopt simultaneously and follow religiously a
virtually identical sales plan for the distribution and pricing of electric
large lamps through the medium of consignment agents, inter alia, and
the practice of inducing distributors to maintain sales prices .... 101
The three defendants had introduced similar sales plans including
schemes of consignment selling and discounts to various segments of the
market. A later plan, eliminating discounts and instituting net pricing,
was subsequently introduced by one of the manufacturers and followed
by the others. By way of defence, the accused argued that there was no
agreement among them to follow an industry sales plan, that their be-
havior amounted to no more than, ". . . rational individual decisions in
the light of relevant economic facts; that this industry is an oligopoly...
that natural oligopolistic pricing does not violate the Act; . . .and that
the actions of the accused were based on pure, non-collusive, oligopolistic
parallelism of action .... ,1"02
The Court was faced with the task of deciding if conscious parallel-
ism is or is not a combines offence and held:
... that the theory of oligopoly pricing is irrelevant to the determina-
tion of whether or not the accused have offended the proscription on
them under the conspiracy section of the Act. As stated in R. v. j W.
Mis &Son Lid et al. (1968) [citations omitted]:
The fact that under the theory of oligopoly prices would have been
the same in the long run is irrelevant. No persons are entitled to
engage in anti-competitive trade practices or policies because this re-
sult may obtain in any event if all things are equal. 1o3
The court held that proof of parallel business behaviour does not conclu-
sively establish an agreement contrary to the provisions of the Combines
Investigation Act, but that all the evidence must be examined. The evi-
99 CAN. REV. STAT. c.23, § 32(i) (1970), as amended by Act of Dec. 15, 1975, Can. Stat.
c.76, § 14(1) (1975).
100 75 D.L.R.3d 664 (1977).
101 Id at 673.
102 Id. at 674.
103 Id at 693.
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dence in this case led to the inference that an agreement existed, and
hence the behaviour in this market amounted to a violation of the Act. 0 4
It is only those agreements or arrangements which limit, prevent or
lessen competition "unduly" which are prohibited by section 32. As the
former Director of Investigation and Research has stated,' 0 5 it is this re-
quirement of "undueness" which tempers the severity of section 32 with
a "rule of reason." The former Director of Investigation and Research
has identified two tests of "undueness" which have evolved from the ju-
risprudence: first, "the manner and degree of limitation of competition"
test and second, "the share of the market accounted for by the conspira-
tors" test. 1
0 6
With respect to the test based on manner and degree, the court in
Rex v. Elliot 0 7 held that under the Combines Investigation Act "compe-
tition is not to be prevented or lessened unduly, that is to say in an undue
manner or degree, wrongly, improperly, excessively, inordinately
.. .0. 8 Subsequent decisions all but ignored this test, but in the re-
cent case of Aetna Insurance Co. v. The Queen,' 0 9 the court spoke of the
design and plan of the agreement in question and of the intent to lessen
competition improperly, inordinately, and excessively. But it has been
the second test, "the share of the market accounted for by the conspira-
tors" which has been most frequently relied upon by the courts as a
measure of the requisite "undueness." It cannot be accurately predicted
what degree of the market must be potentially affected in order for con-
spirators to have been attempting to limit, prevent or lessen competition
unduly. It is clear that an agreement having as one of its objectives the
establishment of a virtual monopoly in a product would be characterized
as undue." 10 In other cases, however, courts have found attempts to limit
competition unduly when the market share affected was far less than a
virtual monopoly. I I I
On the question of "undueness," the judgment of Cartwright, J., in
the case of Howard Smith Paper Md/ls Ltd v. The Queen, 1 2 created much
104 Id. at 699.
105 Henry, supra note 32, at 38.
1o6 Id
107 9 Ont. L.R. 648 (C.A. 1905).
108 Id at 662.
109 75 D.L.R.3d 322 (1977).
l0 Weidman v. Schragge, 2 D.L.R. 734, 761 (1912).
M" Regina v. Abitibi Power and Paper Co., 131 C.C.C. 201 (1960).
112 8 D.L.R.2d 449 (1957). In Howard Smith Paper Mills, Cartwright, J. held that:
In essence the decisions referred to appear to me to hold that an agreement to
prevent or lessen competition in commercial activities of the sort described in the
section becomes criminal when the prevention or lessening agreed upon reaches
the point at which the participants in the agreement become free to carry on
those activities virtually unaffected by the influences of competition, which influ-
ence Parliament is taken to regard as an indispensable protection of the public
interest; that it is the arrogation to the members of the combination of the power
to carry on their activities without competition which is rendered unlawful; that
the question whether the power so obtained is in fact misused is treated as irrele-
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controversy. Cartwright, J. held that in order for competition to be re-
strained unduly, the conspirators must have achieved a virtual monop-
oly. 113 This view was rejected by the Director of Investigation and
Research" 4 and eventually was tempered in several cases."15
Finally, as part of the 1976 amendments to the Combines Investiga-
tion Act, a change was made in section 32. Section 32(1.1) was added to
the Act to instruct the courts that, whatever "unduly" might mean, in
order to establish that a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrange-
ment is in violation of section 32, it was not necessary to prove that the
conspiracy or combination, if carried into effect, would eliminate com-
pletely or virtually competition in the market in question. At present,
then, it is clear what "unduly" does not mean-it does not mean a virtual
monopoly-but it is not clear exactly what "unduly" does mean.
Whether or not competition has been lessened "unduly" is really a ques-
tion of fact in each case." 16
According to the Director of Investigation and Research, the recent
case of Aetna Insurance Co. v. The Queen" 7 "raises questions concerning the
future enforcement and administration of the conspiracy provision of the
Act."' 8 In the Aetna case, the appellant companies, all members of the
Nova Scotia Board of Insurance Underwriters, were charged with con-
spiracy to lessen unduly competition in the price of fire insurance. The
accused companies accounted for a minimum of sixty percent of the fire
vant; and that the court, except I suppose on the question of sentence, is neither
required nor permitted to inquire whether in the particular case the intended and
actual results of the agreement have in fact benefited or harmed the public.
In other words, once it is established that there is an agreement to carry the pre-
vention or lessening of competition to the point mentioned, injury to the public
interest is conclusively presumed, and the parties to the agreement are liable to be
convicted of the offence described in para. 498(l)(d). The relevant question thus
becomes the extent to which the prevention and limitation of competition are
agreed to be carried and not the economic effect of the carrying out of the agree-
ment. In each case which arises under the section the question whether the point
described has been reached becomes one of fact.
Id at 426.
113 Id at 473.
114 Henry, supra note 32, at 39.
115 In the case of Regia v. Anthes Business Forms Ltd., Houlden, J.A. stated:
The extent of the control of the market by the respondents is an important and
material element in deciding the question of fact whether or not the preventing or
lessening of competition is undue, but it is not decisive. Rather, the Court must
conclude from a consideration of all the evidence, including the portion of the
market controlled by the respondents, whether the agreement would prevent or
lessen competition unduly.
10 O.R.2d 153, 181 (C.A. 1975).
116 As Chief Justice Duff stated:
The lessening or prevention agreed upon would, in my opinion, be undue, within
the meaning of the statute, if, when carried into effect, it will prejudice the public
interest in free competition to a degree that the tribunal of fact finds to be undue,
and an agreement to prevent or lessen competition to such an extent is accord-
ingly an offence . . ..
Container Materials v. The King, [1942] 1 D.L.R. 529, 533.
117 75 D.L.R.3d 332 (1977).
118 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 16.
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insurance placed in the province at any time. The accused had all ad-
hered to the premium rates for fire insurance which had been set by the
Board. At trial, the accused were acquitted. On appeal to the Appeal
Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, it was successfully argued
that the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence designed to establish
"public benefit" in what the accused had conspired to do. 119 The Ap-
peal Division imposed fines under the Act, and the accused appealed to
the Supreme Court of Canada. In the Supreme Court of Canada the
acquittal of the insurance companies was restored, the court holding that
the trial judge had acted properly when he looked at evidence establish-
ing the benefits to the public from the agreements in question. The
Supreme Court found that evidence of public benefit had been offered
not by way of defence or justification, but rather as relevant to the ques-
tion of the design of the agreement.
120
With respect to the question of undueness, the trial judge found that
the agreement did not lessen competition unduly. The trial judge relied
upon the "manner and degree test," finding that the arrangements in
question had not affected competition in any manner that could be said
to be undue, inordinate, or excessive. The majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada agreed with the trial judge as the trier of fact in this
regard. The Director of Investigation and Research has stated, however,
that the majority in the Supreme Court was requiring a virtual monop-
oly to be established in order to convict on a conspiracy charge, despite a
trend away from such a requirement. 1
21
With respect to mens rea, it should be noted that to establish an
accused's guilt under section 32, the onus is upon the Crown to prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that the accused intended to enter into a
conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement and that the con-
spiracy, etc., if carried into effect, would prevent, limit or lessen competi-
tion unduly.' 22 Therefore, there is no onus upon the Crown in a
119 In the often cited case of Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. v. The Queen, 8 D.L.R.2d
449 (1957), it was stated that the public is entitled to the benefit of free competition and that
good motives are not a defence to a prosecution for a combines offense. Id at 452.
.120 The Director of Investigation and Research is of the opinion that proof of "public bene-
fit" has traditionally been irrelevant and should not be admitted to defeat a conspiracy charge.
The offense is in the agreement, not in the result, and to admit evidence of "public benefit" for
the purpose of determining whether the object of the agreement is to lessen competition unduly,
could have an absurd result. "Applying the.., test, depending upon the point in time when a
conspiracy was charged, it would be possible for different verdicts in respect of an agreement to
result." ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 19.
121 More precisely, the Director stated:
[I]t would appear that Richie, J., speaking for the majority, was adopting a vir-
tual monopoly concept in stating that the charge covered the whole industry in
the Province and that an offence was not established by proving that a single
group accounting for a large portion of the industry agreed upon common pre-
mium rates.
Id at 17.
122 See Regina v. Anthes Business Forms Ltd., 10 O.R.2d 153 (1975); Container Materials
Ltd. v. The King, [1942] 1 D.L.R. 529.
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prosecution under section 32 to establish that the parties had the inten-
tion to lessen competition unduly. The Crown must show only that they
had the intention to enter into an agreement, whether or not carried into
effect, which would prevent or lessen competition unduly.' 2
3
Subsection 32(2) of the Combines Investigation Act, provides a lim-
ited exemption from the conspiracy provisions of section 32(1) for agree-
ments or arrangements relating to typical trade association activities, e.g.
agreements providing for the exchange of statistics, standards and credit
information. However, subsection 32(3) provides that the exemption is
inoperative if the agreement or arrangement in question has lessened or
is likely to lessen competition unduly in respect of prices, quantity, or
quality of production, markets or customers, channels or methods of dis-
tribution, or if tie activities in question create a barrier to market entry.
American lawyers are quite familiar with the potential problems created
by the activities of trade associations, but Canadian jurisprudence is not
as developed in this area. 124
The other principal exemption to section 32 is the export exemption
set out in subsection 32(4), which provides that the court shall not con-
vict if a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement relates only
to the export of products from Canada. This subsection has been added
to the Act in order to allow Canadian companies to combine and com-
pete effectively on the world market. However, combinations or arrange-
ments in the export trade are not acceptable 25 if they reduce or limit the
volume of exports of a product, restrain or injure the export business of a
domestic competitor not a party to the arrangement, restrict market en-
try or lessen competition unduly in relation to a product in the domestic
market. The Competition Bureau will scrutinize export agreements to
ensure that they do not mask an arrangement with respect to the domes-
tic market and to ensure that the arrangement falls squarely within one
of the exceptions in the Act.
Finally, subsection 32(7) provides an exemption for combinations
among affiliated companies.
B. Bid Riggng
The offence of 'bid rigging," the sole "per se offence" under the
Combines Investigation Act, was added to the Act by the Stage I
Amendments in 1976. While bid rigging activities were within the ambit
of subsection 32(1), the specific provision was added to the Act to elimi-
123 The recent case of Regina v. Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co., [1976] Que. C.S. 421, has
reaffirmed the above.
124 See Regina v. St. Lawrence Corp., 51 C.P.R. 170 (1966). It may be that the list of
exempt activities in subsection 32(2) is not limitative, that there may be other activities which
may be engaged in by competitors and which would not constitute an offence under subsection
32(l), e.g., common representations to the government or the courts or educational pro-
grammes. See Clarry, Cri'mnal Onses, NEW COMBINES LEGISLATION 1, 9 (1977).
125 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, at §§ 32(5)(a)-32(5)(d).
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nate the need to prove an undue lessening of competition, which would
be required in any prosecution of bid rigging under subsection 32(1). As
indicated in Proposals For a New Competition Pohc for Canada,'2 6 the new
section makes bid rigging an offence, recognizing that it is a dishonest
practice and that prolonged inquiry into effects on the market and mar-
ket shares would be irrelevant. The provision with respect to bid rigging
does not preclude joint bids, if openly described as such, or arrangements
with respect to the bids of affiliates. It is interesting to note that in a
prosecution of almost the entire Canadian dredging industry for bid rig-
ging, the Crown prosecuted under sections of the Criminal Code relating
to defrauding the public, rather than proceeding under the Combines
Investigation Act. At the time charges were laid, the separate bid rigging
offence had not yet become part of the Act, and the Crown wished to
avoid the need to prove that the bid rigging activities, which could have
been attacked under section 32(1), had resulted in an "undue" lessening
of competition. 127
C Merger and Monopolj
Section 33 of the Act provides that every person who is a party or
privy to or knowingly assists in the formation of a merger or monopoly, is
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for two
years.' 12 The definition of merger is broad, and includes both vertical
and horizontal mergers, but the definition is qualified by the require-
ment that the merger must lessen or be likely to lessen competition "to
the detriment or against the interest of the public." Although the
number of mergers in Canada continues to grow, few have been at-
tacked, and the government has never obtained a conviction in this area.
This is less a comment upon the benign effect of Canadian mergers than
it is a comment upon the difficulties of proof and the unworkability of
the statute provisions in this regard.
126 DEP'T OF CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS, SUPPLY AND SERVICES, CANADA,
PROPOSALS FOR A NEW COMPETITION POLICY FOR CANADA, FIRST STAGE 1975 (1977).
127 Regina v. McNamara, [unreported], Supreme Court of Ontario, verdict rendered May
5, 1979 (currently under appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario). For a full discussion of bid
rigging under the Combines Investigation Act see Regina v. J.J. Beamish Construction Co., 65
D.L.R.2d 260 (1967). In that case, the accused were acquitted because they were providing a
service, and services were not, at that time, covered by the Act. However, the Court commented
extensively about bid rigging and business ethics.
128 The Act defines merger as follows:
'[Mierger' means the acquisition by one or more persons, whether by purchase or
lease of shares or assets or otherwise, of any control over or interest in the whole or
part of the business of a competitor, supplier, customer or any other person,
whereby competition
(a) in a trade, industry or profession,
(b) among the sources of supply of a trade, industry or profession,
(c) among the outlets for sales of a trade, industry or profession, or
(d) otherwise than in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c),
is or is likely to be lessened to the detriment or against the interest of the public
whether consumers, producers or others.
Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, § 33.
CANADIAN ANTITRUST 79
There have been only three court decisions of significance. In Regla
v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., 129 the court grappled with the meaning of
"detriment to the public" in the merger definition and determined that,
for there to be "detriment to the public," control of a substantial segment
of the market must result from the merger. The court thus applied to the
merger provision the "share of the market" test which had evolved in the
conspiracy cases under section 32. In Regina v. British Columbia Sugar Refin-
ing Co. 130 even though the accused had a virtual monopoly, there was an
acquittal on the grounds that the Crown had failed to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the merger had operated or was likely to operate
to the detriment of the public.' 3 ' The Supreme Court of Canada finally
had a chance to consider the merger question in the K.C Irving'3 2 case,
and "that decision disposed of whatever hopes may have remained that
the present criminal prohibition of mergers would be an effective instru-
ment."1
33
The .C Irving case arose from the takeover by K.C. Irving Ltd. of
virtually all of the English language newspapers in the Province of New
Brunswick. The Supreme Court of Canada held that there was no doubt
that K.C. Irving Ltd. had such control in the market to satisfy the intro-
ductory portions of the merger and monopoly definitions. However, two
questions remained in relation to the definition of merger: first,
"whether by reason of the acquisition of that control, 'competition is or is
likely to be lessened to the detriment or against the interest of the pub-
lic;' 134 and, second, in relation to the definition of monopoly, "whether
the person or persons having such control 'have operated or are likely to
operate [the controlled business] to the detriment or against the interest
of the public.' "135 The Supreme Court took the view that the argu-
ments of Crown counsel had been based upon, "a mistaken application
to the present case of the law governing unlawful conspiracies or agree-
ments unduly to prevent or lessen competition."'' 3 6 The court rejected
the view that a presumption of detriment to the public arises from the
fact that one person has gained complete or substantial control of a par-
ticular market. The court held that it was not open for the Crown to rely
upon a presumption in a criminal case, unless that presumption is set out
in the legislation. The onus, therefore, remained with the Crown to
prove detriment to the public arising from the activities in question. The
129 [1960] O.R. 601.
130 38 C.P.R. 177 (1962).
131 "[O]n the basis of these two decisions we are left in the position that a very high degree
of concentration is required (a virtual monopoly or virtual stifling of competition) before the
courts will strike down a merger as being to the detriment of the public." Henry, supra note 32,
at 69.
132 Regina v. K.C. Irving, Ltd., 72 D.L.R.3d 82 (1976).
133 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 14.
134 72 D.L.R.3d at 90.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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Crown had offered no evidence of detriment, while the defence had ten-
dered evidence that the public had benefited from the takeover. Circula-
tion had increased, staff had enlarged and editorial automony had been
maintained. 137 It is unlikely that, without amendments to the Combines
Investigation Act, a successful prosecution of a merger will be possible.
2. Monopoly
"Monopoly" is defined in section 2 of the Act.1 38 Monopoly per
se is not unlawful. The offence consists in the abuse of monopoly
position. 139
Until quite recently, the leading monopoly case was that of Rex v.
Edd Match Limited.'40 Practically though, that case is of little assist-
ance because it concerned the most blatant form of monopolization.
A more recent case is that of Regina v. Canadian General Electric Company
Ltd 141 In that case, Pennell, J. of the Ontario High Court of Justice,
held that: ". . . in order to make out the crime of monopolization it
is necessary to prove these two things: (1) control on the part of one
or more persons and (2) detriment or the likelihood of it. '142 With
respect to "detriment or the likelihood of it" the court rejected the
notion that the detriment must be "undue" in order for the activity to
be enjoined. The court was of the view that the insertion of the word
"undue," borrowed from the section 32 conspiracy provision, before
the word detriment was not warranted. 143 The court held that the
137 The court stated:
In the light of the definition of "merger" in the present Combines Investigations
Act it is impossible to say that acquisition of entire control over a business in a
market area (as contrasted with acquisition of some control) must mean without
more not only that competition therein was or was likely to be lessened but that
by reason of such control the lessening or likely lessening is to the detriment or
against the interest of the public. Even if the acquisition of entire control would
be enough to support an inference of lessening or likely lessening of competition,
that inference cannot be drawn here, in the face of the evidence and the findings
thereon by the trial Judge and by the Court of Appeal that the pre-existing com-
petition where it existed, remained and was to some degree intensified by the
take-over of the newspapers.
Id. at 94.
138 '[M]onopoly' means a situation where one or more persons either substantially
or completely control throughout Canada or any area thereof the class or species
of business in which they are engaged and have operated such business or are
likely to operate it to the detriment or against the interest of the public, whether
consumers, producers, or others, but a situation shall not be deemed a monopoly
within the meaning of this definition by reason only of the exercise of any right or
enjoyment of any interest derived under the Patent Act, or any other Act of the
Parliament of Canada.
Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, § 2.
139 Se Regina v. Canadian General Electric Co., 75 D.L.R.3d 664 (1976).
140 109 C.C.C. 1 (1953).
141 75 D.L.R.3d 664 (1976).
142 Id at 710.
143 75 D.L.R.3d 664 (Ont. 1976). The court stated that "[tihe standard in each instance
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concept of public interest required the court, ". . . to weigh the
proven benefits against the proven evils to determine if detriment has
resulted. . . . Whether the acts of those who control the market may
be considered detrimental is a question of fact for the court to deter-
mine."' 144 Thus, the court rejected the view that market share could
be determinative of detriment to the public. Shortly after the deci-
sion in Regina v. Canadian General Electric Company Led, the Supreme
Court of Canada decided the KC Irving, Ltd case,' 45 which conclu-
sively held that market share is just one of several factors to consider
in the prosecution of a monopoly.
D. Price Discrimination and Predatory Pricing
The price discrimination section 146 is designed to prevent a "prac-
tise of discrimination" carried out by a supplier against competitors of a
purchaser of products from the supplier. Any discount, rebate, allow-
ance, price concession or other advantage available to one purchaser
must be available to his competitors with respect to a sale of articles of
like quality and quantity. Predatory pricing provisions, contained in
subsections 34(l)(b) and (c), are concerned with the large national corpo-
ration which might use its deep pocket to destroy smaller competitors in
particular geographic locations and with policies of selling products at
unreasonably low prices which have the effect of eliminating competi-
tion. As in the case of the price discrimination provision, an isolated
lowering of price to meet spot competition would be permissible. It is
conduct with the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competi-
tion or eliminating it or conduct designed to have such an effect which is
of concern.
E Price Maintenance
Section 38(l)(a) of the Act, deals with price maintenance. The pro-
vision has been amended so that it will include attempts to influence
prices upwards or downwards, by any means whatsoever. It is not just
the producer or supplier of a product who will be caught in an attempt
to influence prices, but also any one engaged in a business that relates to
credit cards or who has exclusive rights conferred by trademark or copy-
right. The provision dealing- with suggested retail prices14 7 has been
amended so that a suggestion of a resale price will be proof of an attempt
to influence prices unless the producer or supplier, who suggested the
resale price, also made it clear to the person to whom the suggestion was
has been set by the definition of the offence. To require the detriment be undue would alter the
standard provided by the statute." Id at 714.
144 Id.
145 72 D.L.R.3d 82 (1976).
146 CAN. REV. STAT. c.23, § 34(1)(a) (1970).
147 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, as amended by Act of Dec. 15, 1976, Can. Stat.
c.76, § 38(3) (1976).
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made that he was not under any obligation to accept the suggestion and
would not suffer in his business relations if he failed to do so. The resale
price prohibition does not apply with respect to a price affixed to a prod-
uct or its packaging. Subsection 38(l)(b), makes it an offence to refuse to
supply a product or otherwise discriminate against a person in business
because of the low pricing policy of that person. However, subsection
38(9) provides that it is a defence to a charge under subsection 38(l)(b) if
the refusal to supply was because of loss-leadering by the purchaser.
F Other Combtnes Offences
The Combines Investigation Act contains provisions more in the na-
ture of consumer protection legislation than anti-trust legislation. These
provisions cannot be effectively discussed in a paper of this length. How-
ever, certain points should be noted. Misleading advertising provi-
sions, 148 which formerly dealt with misleading price representations,
misleading advertising and unsubstantiated claims, have been aug-
mented by the recent amendments to the Act and now include provisions
dealing with misleading warranties, guarantees and promises with re-
spect to repairs. The Act now embraces representations made "by any
means whatsoever" which are false or misleading in a material respect.
It is now an offence to make a representation to the public, in the form of
a statement, guarantee, or warranty, of the performance, efficacy or life
of a product if such a representation is not based on an adequate test.
The onus is on the person making the representation to establish that the
testing was adequate. A new section' 49 creates offences with respect to
testimonials about a product and representations with respect to tests of
a product. The burden is upon the person making the representation or
publishing the testimonial to establish that the test in question was made
or the testimonial in question was given. The Act now contains a provi-
sioni 5° dealing with bait and switch selling-the practice whereby a
product is advertised at a bargain price, and the seller does not have on
hand sufficient quantities. If a bargain price is advertised, a "reasonable
quantity" of the product must be available. If a supplier has taken rea-
sonable steps to ensure that such reasonable quantities are on hand, he
will not be liable under the Act. Sales above advertised price are covered
by the Act.1 5 1 The Act mandates the method of conducting promotional
contests i52 and attacks deceptive marketing practices such as double tick-
eting, 153 pyramid selling' 54 and referral selling.155 A "due diligence" de-
148 Id. § 36.
149 Id § 36.1.
Io Id. § 37.
151 Id § 37.1. This section makes it an offence to supply a product at a price higher than
the price advertised in the market. Id
152 Id § 37.2.
153 Id § 36.2.
154 Id § 36.3.
155 Id § 36.4.
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fence is available in the case of misleading advertising and the provisions
relating to testimonials.' 56 Lastly, the Act contains an offence with re-
spect to conspiracy in relation to professional sport. It is an offence to
limit unreasonably the opportunity for a person to participate as player
or competitor in professional sport, to impose unreasonable conditions
upon such participation or to limit unreasonably the opportunity for any
person to negotiate and play for the club of his choice. 15 7 The Act pro-
vides, however, that in determining if an agreement violates the provi-
sion, regard should be had to whether or not the sport in question is
organized on an international basis. For that reason conditions should
be accepted in Canada and, as well, the court should consider the desira-
bility of maintaining a balance among teams in the same league.
G Reviewable Practices'15 8
The 1976 amendments to the Combines Investigation Act created a
category of "matters reviewable by the Restrictive Trade Practices Com-
mission."'1 59 The "reviewable practices," refusals to deal, consignment
selling, exclusive dealing, tied selling and market restriction, 160 are not
offences leading to criminal prosecution before the courts, but may result
in civil proceedings before the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission.
Because the "reviewable practices" are practices which may or may not
have an anti-competitive effect, they are treated in this manner rather
than as offences. However, for the same reasons indicated earlier' 6 1 there
is doubt about the constitutional validity of this part of the Act. In deal-
ing with reviewable matters, the Commission has at its disposal a range
of remedies depending upon the specific practice in question. Remedies
may consist of an order to a supplier to make a product available, recom-
mendations to the Minister of Finance that customs duties on products
be removed or remitted to place competitors on an equal footing, cease
and desist orders or orders containing any other requirement the Com-
mission considers necessary to overcome the effects of a practice on the
market and to restore and stimulate competition. 162 The Director of In-
vestigation and Research initiates the application to the Commission
156 Id § 37.3(2).
157 Id § 32.3.
158 For a full discussion see Kaiser, Reviewable Marketing Practces. The New Jurtsdtion of the
Restrictiie Trade Practices Commission, NEW COMBINES LEGISLATION 155-76 (1977).
159 The reviewable practices consist of three categories of practices, "those restricting distri-
bution of a product" (restrictions on distribution), "those excluding or foreclosing competing
firms" (exclusionary practices), and those relating to foreign judgments, law and directives. Id
at 159. The jurisdiction of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission with regard to review-
able practices is new and there have been few matters referred to the Commission.
160 Combines Investigation Act, supra note 22, as amended by Act of Dec. 15, 1976, Can. Stat.
c.76, §§ 31.2-31.9.
161 See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
162 See text accompanying notes 158-168.
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with respect to reviewable matters. The Restrictive Trade Practice Com-
mission may not act on its own initiative or upon the application of the
public. Before the Director applies to the Commission for review he will
already have completed his own inquiry. The Director is required to
make such an inquiry whenever he has reason to believe that grounds
exist for the making of an order under Part IV. 1, the reviewable practices
provisions, or upon the application of six persons or upon the direction of
the Minister.1 63 The Director's application to the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission will contain a precise statement of the facts alleged
and the grounds of the application, a reference to the section of the Act
under which the application is made, particulars of the order applied for
and the list of relative pages of transcript from the Director's inquiry.
The application is served on the respondent. The respondent must reply
with a statement of the grounds upon which he opposes the application
The Director has the burden of proof in hearings before the Commission.
Orders of the Commission are not subject to appeal, but judicial review
is possible. It is a criminal offence to fail to comply with an order of the
Commission, and a breach of an order of the Commission may give rise
to civil damages.
. Exclusionarg Practices
a. Refusals to Deal
Prior to the addition of section 31.2 to the Act, there was no
prohibition against a refusal to supply which was unrelated to an at-
tempt to influence prices. Section 31.2 now provides that where a
person is substantially affected in his business or precluded in carry-
ing on his business due to inability to obtain adequate supplies of a
product anywhere in the market on usual trade terms, and the prob-
lem is the result of insufficient competition among suppliers, the
Commission may act. The Commission may order a supplier to ac-
cept a person as a customer or recommend to the Minister of Finance
that any customs duties on the product be altered so as to place all
persons dealing in that product on an equal footing. Subsection
31.2(2) indicates that one cannot demand supply of a particular
brand of a product, unless the brand occupies such a dominant posi-
tion in the market that the ability of a person to carry on his business
in a class of articles will be substantially affected unless he has access
to that particular brand.
b. Refusal to Sell by Foreigners
Section 31.7 now enables the Commission to act in a situation in
163 Id §§ 7-8.
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which a foreign supplier has refused to supply a product or otherwise
discriminated in the supply of a product to a person in Canada be-
cause of the exertion of buying power outside Canada by another per-
son. This section would apply to a situation in which a powerful
foreign parent might attempt to compel a foreign supplier to with-
hold a product from a Canadian buyer in competition with a subsidi-
ary of the foreign parent.
c. TWd Sale 164
Tied selling is reviewable under subsection 31.4(2) when the
Commission finds that tied selling, because it is widespread in a mar-
ket or engaged in by a major supplier, is likely to impede market
entry, impede introduction of a product or have other exclusionary
effect with the result that competition is lessened or likely to be less-
ened substantially. The tied selling must constitute a practice. The
difficult question will be to determine when competition has been
substantially lessened as a result of tied selling. The Act sets out situ-
ations in which tied selling would be acceptable.165
d Exclusive Deahng
Section 31.4 defines "exclusive dealing" as any practice whereby
a supplier of a product, as a condition of supplying a product to a
customer, requires that customer to deal only or primarily in products
supplied or designated by the supplier or refrain from dealing in a
specified product. It also encompasses any practice whereby a sup-
plier offers a product on more favourable terms if the customer agrees
to take a specified product or refrain from dealing in other products.
When exclusive dealing impedes entry into a market because it is
widespread or engaged in by a major supplier or has any other exclu-
sionary effect, causing competition to be substantially lessened, the
Commission may make certain orders to overcome the effects on com-
petition. Again the problem will be in determining when the practice
results in a substantial lessening of competition. Exceptions are pro-
vided under the Act. It is not an offence to engage in exclusive deal-
ing when done for a reasonable period of time to facilitate entry of a
new supplier of a product into the market or when done between and
164 The statute defines tied selling as the practice whereby a supplier requires a customer to
acquire another product or refrain from using another product as a condition of sale. Id § 31.4.
165 A supplier of a product may engage in tied selling in order to facilitate new supplier or
product entry when a technological relationship exists between the tied product and the tying
product and when engaged in by a person in the business of lending money for the purpose of
better servicing loans and when reasonably necessary for such a purpose. Also, affiliated compa-
nies may engage in tied sales. Id § 31.4.
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among companies, partnerships or sole proprietorships that are affili-
ated. 166 Further, subsection 31.4(5)(c), provides an exception to cover
voluntary buying groups. When one party grants to another the right
to use a trademark to identify the business of the grantee, e.g., a
franchise arrangement, an exception exists.
2. Restrictions of Ditrzution
a. Consignment Selling
Consignment selling might be used as a method of maintaining
prices. Therefore, by virtue of section 31.3, consignment selling is a
reviewable matter. If it is found that the practice was undertaken to
control prices or in order to discriminate between consignees or be-
tween dealers, a cease and desist order may issue.
6. Territorial or Customer Restr'cton
Territorial or customer restrictions called "market restric-
tions" 1 67 in the Canadian Act are reviewable matters, not offences,
and will result in only cease and desist or other similar orders. As in
the cases of tied selling and exclusive dealing, the Commission may
intervene when a practice of market restriction is engaged in by a
major supplier or is widespread in a market with the result that the
practice is likely to impede entry of a firm into the market, impede
the introduction of a product or have some other exclusionary effect
resulting in reduced competition. Again, market restriction is excus-
able if engaged in for a limited period of time in order to facilitate
entry of a new supplier of a product into the market.
3. Foreign Judgments, Laws and Directives
New provisions added to the Combines Investigation Act in 1976
give the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission jurisdiction with re-
spect to the implementation of foreign judgments in Canada and the
implementation of foreign laws and government directives in Can-
ada.
Section 31.5 is concerned with foreign judgments, decrees, orders
or other process. When the Commission finds that a foreign judg-
ment or other process can be implemented in Canada by persons or
166 Id. §§ 31.4(4)-31.4(5).
167 Section 31.4 defines market restriction as:
any practice whereby a supplier of a product as a condition of supplying a prod-
uct to a customer requires that customer to supply any product only in a defined
market or exacts a penalty of any kind from the customer if he supplies any prod-
uct outside a defined market.
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corporations and that the implementation of the judgment, decree,
order or other process would adversely affect competition and ad-
versely affect the efficiency of trade or industry in Canada, without
bringing about increases in competition, the Commission may order
that no steps be taken in Canada to implement the foreign judgment.
Section 31.6 is concerned with actions by companies incorpo-
rated in Canada, where such actions are the result of foreign laws, or
a direction, instruction, intimation of policy or other communication
from a foreign government or person in a position to influence the
actions of the Canadian company. The section is also concerned with
directives which have the purpose of giving effect to a conspiracy en-
tered into outside of Canada which, if entered into in Canada, would
be a violation of section 32. The Commission will intervene if the
actions of a Canadian company, if implemented, would have any of
the adverse results indicated above with respect to foreign judgments.
The Commission may order that no actions be taken in Canada to
implement foreign directives in any manner other than stipulated by
the Commission. Sections 31.5 and 31.6 were added to the Act in an
attempt to thwart the extraterritorial reach of U.S. anti-trust laws,
without claiming for Canada an extraterritorial jurisdiction, and to
provide Canadian combines authorities with the power to prevent
foreign entities from implementing anti-competitive schemes in Can-
ada.
V. The Proposed Stage II Amendments'"
As indicated earlier, the status of the Stage II amendments to the
Combines Investigation Act is uncertain. At this date it is impossible to
predict if, when, and in what form those changes might be reintroduced.
However, a brief glance at the proposed changes which were dropped
will highlight some possible directions.
Under the proposed bill, the jurisdiction of the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission was to be expanded and vested in a new body
called the "Competition Board." The Director of Investigation and Re-
search was to be renamed the "Competition Policy Advocate" and to be
given broadened responsibilities. Procedural changes provided that the
Governor in Council was to be empowered to set aside orders of the
Competition Board when they conflicted with government economic and
social goals. Class action suits were provided for, and provision was
made for the signing of consent decrees with respect to reviewable prac-
tices referred to the Board for an order. Lastly, provision was made for
the Competition Policy Advocate to issue interpretive bulletins.
168 See generaly COMPETITION POLICY IN CANADA: STAGE II, BILL C-13 (J. Rowley & W.
Stanbury ed. 1978).
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Not unexpectedly, the new bill proposed to completely revamp the
merger provisions of the present Act. The criminal prohibition against
merger was to be repealed, and the civil review of mergers to be provided
for. The Competition Policy Advocate would still have to establish that
a merger would lead to a "substantial lessening of competition." But the
accused would be able to argue, by way of defence, that the merger
would bring about a clear probability of substantial gains in efficiency.
The Competition Board was to prohibit only those mergers which would
result in a substantial lessening of competition with no redeeming vir-
tues. With respect to horizontal mergers, only those accounting for
twenty percent or more of a market were to be subject to review. The
Competition Policy Advocate was to be given the ability to preclear
mergers, and the Advocate was to have only a limited period of time
during which to attack a pending merger. One year after the receipt by
the Advocate of a notice of merger provided by the merging parties, the
Advocate was to become powerless to stop the merger. The proposed Act
provided that the Advocate might notify the Foreign Investment Review
Agency that he intended to review the merger aspects of a takeover, in
which case the Foreign Investment Review Agency would refrain from
reviewing that aspect of the takeover, thereby eliminating duplicative
proceedings. In addition to retaining the current criminal prohibition
against monopolies, the new bill proposed a civil monopoly jurisdiction.
The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission was to be given power to
review single entity monopoly as well as "joint monopolization." How-
ever, in all cases it was to be a defence if the conduct under review re-
flected superior efficiency or superior economic performance.
With respect to specialization agreements, provision was made for
the bringing of such agreements before the Competition Board in order
that an exemption from the conspiracy provisions of section 32 might be
obtained. A specialization agreement is one whereby a party undertakes
to discontinue production of a particular article, on the condition that
another party discontinues production of another article and includes an
agreement that each party will make purchases of their now discontin-
ued product from the other. Though it might approve a specialization
agreement, the Board was to be under an obligation to reject an agree-
ment likely to totally eliminate competition.
As had been suggested by many, the bill proposed changes with re-
spect to price discrimination. While leaving intact the criminal prohibi-
tion against price discrimination, the Board was to be given power to
review "price differentiation." A defence was to be available where vol-
ume discounts could be justified by cost savings. Further changes were
suggested with respect to the actions of multinational enterprises. The
Board was to be empowered to issue prohibition orders when restrictions
imposed by multinational enterprises or their affiliates were designed to
protect price levels in Canada from the influence of lower priced prod-
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ucts from abroad, or to protect price levels in a market outside Canada,
from lower priced products available from Canada. A new section was
to provide that the criminal provision dealing with cartel agreements
would not apply to a cartel authorized by an act of the Parliament. The
new bill also set out the circumstances in which regulated industries were
to be exempted from the provisions of the Combines Investigation Act
and provided the Competition Policy Advocate with increased powers
with respect to interventions in the regulatory process.
Question and Answer Period
Mr. Campbell: I was given two questions asking that I elaborate on
the interplay of the Foreign Investment Review Act and the Canadian
Combines Investigation Act. For those of you who are unfamiliar with
the Foreign Investment Review Act, the Act provides review jurisdiction
for the government when a foreign company proposes to take over a Ca-
nadian business or expand its own operations in Canada. There is an
overlap between the two statutes presently. The Director of Investiga-
tion and Research under the Combines Investigation Act has the possi-
bility of intervening in a hearing before the Foreign Investment Review
Agency (FIRA), but there is definitely an overlap. Approval by FIRA
today will not insulate against Combines Investigation Act problems to-
morrow. However, it is not likely that a foreign company would have
trouble once it obtained FIRA approval. I should point out that the
proposed changes to the Combines Investigation Act contain a provision
whereby the Competition Policy Advocate may notify the Foreign In-
vestment Review Agency that the competition people intend to review
the merger aspects of the takeover. Once that notice has been given to
the Foreign Investment Review Agency, FIRA will not then review the
merger aspects of the takeover, but they will examine the other aspects in
their jurisdiction. For example, FIRA will require foreign companies to
provide information concerning the impact of the takeover on Canadian
employees, management, etc.
Question: Do the provinces retain any relevant power impugning di-
rectly or indirectly in antitrust matters?
Mr. Campbell: I think the simple answer is no. The regulation of
anticompetitive practices is exclusively with the federal government.
However, the provinces do have a broad degree of consumer protection
legislation which will overlap with some of the federal regulation.
Question: Please comment upon bid rigging and define it.
Mr. Campbell: Bid rigging means an agreement or arrangement be-
tween or among two or more persons whereby one or more of them agree
to undertake not to submit a bid in response to a call or request for bids
or tenders. For example, Canada's longest jury trial has recently ended;
the trial concerned bid rigging. Interestingly, the prosecution did not
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occur under the Combines Investigation Act since the Act did not en-
compass bid rigging at the time charges were brought. If the Crown had
proceeded under the Combines Investigation Act it would have had to
proceed under Section 32; thus, the Government would have had to
prove an undue restraint.
Question: What should be the title of a retail price list published by
the supplier for use by dealers?
Mr. Campbell: I don't suppose the title really matters, but it is not
enough to state that prices are suggested only. A supplier should state
both that prices are suggested only and that the dealer or supplier is
under no obligation to charge those prices and will not suffer in his busi-
ness relation with the manufacturer or any other person if he does not
adhere to those prices. That's the sort of advice we're giving clients to-
day with respect to suggested resale prices.
Qyestion: Is English common law of any use with respect to monopo-
lies and restraints in trade in Canada?
Mr. Campbell: Yes, but since things are hopelessly muddled at this
point, I don't know if it would give us any real help.
Question: Under Canadian law is the U.S. manufacturer responsible
for assuring that his Caiadian distributor allocates the funds on a pro-
portional basis?
Mr. Campbell: Allowances have to be offered on a proportional basis.
They have to be available. Now, of course, there is a debate about
whether a supplier must phone everybody up and say that an allowance
is available.
Question: You mentioned that Canadian law usually does not have
an extraterritorial application. Suppose the American manufacturer has
only one customer in Canada and that customer has its own customers.
The monies are channeled through that distributor to the distributor's
customers. In the United States the manufacturer is usually responsible
for assuring that the customer's customers get the money. Is that the case
in Canada?
Mr. Campbell: I don't think that the Canadian authorities would go
after the U.S. manufacturer as a matter of choice. I think they would go
after the dealer in that situation. That's typically been the response to
avoid all the problems created by the whole extraterritoriality issue and
go after the one in Canada who has implemented the offence.
